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Abstract 
 
 
Despite theoretical justifications and empirical evidence that state owned enterprises have 
played an important role in late development, as well as over three decades of evidence that 
privatization programmes since the 1980s have had mixed results at best, international 
financial institutions continue prescribing privatization as panacea for developing countries. 
Pakistan is an interesting case to understand why privatization is still embraced, because it is 
one of a set of developing countries that have whole-heartedly implemented Washington 
Consensus policies. In this context, we analyse privatization in two key economic sectors in 
Pakistan, energy and banking. Using qualitative and quantitative data, we describe the 
motivations behind these privatizations, the process by which they were carried out, and 
analyze the post-privatization performance of these organizations and sectors. We find that in 
both cases a) the privatizations failed not only with respect to their stated aims, leading to a 
decline in national productive capabilities, but also had adverse distributional consequences, 
shifting the rewards to the buyers while the risks and costs remained with the public sector, 
and b) the suboptimal outcomes of the privatizations went largely unchallenged aided by a 
prevalent neoliberal view amongst the country’s economic policy makers and intelligentsia. 
Our analysis sheds new light on the process by which privatization in the absence of a state 
with the capacity to discipline business interests, has enabled these interests to obtain state-
sponsored rents without bringing any of the associated benefits for economic development. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
It is widely recognized that many successful late developing countries have boasted, 
and benefited from, a substantial state owned sector during their rapid growth periods. 
Amongst the ‘East Asian Tigers’, for instance, Taiwan has had one of the largest 
public sectors in the developing world outside the oil producers, and achieved one of 
highest growth rates in the postwar period2. Similarly, Korea had a very large state 
owned sector with crucial intermediate inputs such as steel, oil, coal, gas, electricity, 
and fertilizers having been supplied by public enterprises. Singapore’s government 
owns controlling stakes in a host of highly efficient and profitable enterprises called 
‘government-linked companies’ which extend to sectors beyond public utilities and 
infrastructure such as shipbuilding, aviation, engineering, shipping and banking3 . 
Finally, China has refused to close down its State-owned enterprises (SOE), choosing 
instead to opt for greater managerial autonomy and larger scale4.  
These countries have been emulating Western models where SOEs historically 
played a key role. Post-war growth in many European economies including Austria, 
Norway, and Italy, was achieved with large SOE sectors often being at the forefront 
of technological modernization, until at least the 1980s.  France and Finland are two 
notable examples. In France, well-known firms such as Renault, Alcatel, Usinor, 
Thomson, Thales, and Elf Aquitaine led technological modernization and industrial 
                                                        
2 H-J. Chang, and I. Grabel, Reclaiming development: an alternative economic policy manual, Zed 
Books, London, 2004. 
3 J-S. Shin, ‘Globalization and challenges to the developmental state: A comparison between South 
Korea and Singapore’, Global Economic Review, 34 (4), 2005; H-J. Chang, State Owned Enterprise 
Reform, United Nations, Department for Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) 2007 p.9.  
4 P. Nolan and X. Wang, ‘Beyond Privatisation: Institutional innovation and growth in China’s large 
state-owned enterprises’, World Development, 27(1), 1999, pp. 169-200.  
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development under state ownership in the areas of automobiles, telecommunications, 
steel, electronics, defense, and oil and gas 5 . Similarly, in Finland, SOEs led 
technological modernization in forestry, mining, steel, transport equipment, paper 
machinery and chemical industries6.  
However, following the 1970s oil shocks and economic crisis in the developed 
world, the social democratic ‘mixed-economy’ model and Keynesian aggregate 
demand management was increasingly questioned, ushering in the rise to prominence 
of monetarist, public choice and property rights theories, or what has been termed 
‘neoliberalism’. An overall change in development thinking amongst IFIs and local 
policy makers was seen, with trade, financial, and labor market liberalization and 
deregulation now dominating the agenda. These views were codified in the late 80s in 
the now infamous ‘Washington Consensus’7.  
As part of this wider shift, a spate of privatizations was pushed through. The 
campaign was particularly noticeable in developing countries where desperate 
economic circumstances and dependence on loans from international financial 
institutions (IFIs) left little choice but to sell SOEs 8 . Thus, across many Latin 
American countries state assets in sectors ranging from manufacturing, finance and 
mining, to social services were sold off, with Chile taking the lead, followed by 
Mexico, Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil 9 . In Sub-Saharan Africa, although few 
governments explicitly adopted an SOE divestment strategy, there was still a 
significant amount of privatization, especially in countries like Mozambique10 Ghana 
and Nigeria 11 , while privatization in East Asia lagged behind 12 . In South Asia, 
Pakistan and India led the proceedings, but while India generated revenue largely 
from minority share sales, retaining strategic control, Pakistan handed over strategic 
control in a wide variety of sectors13. 
After more than three decades of privatizing SOEs, however, the outcomes have 
been mixed at best. In fact, much research has shown how privatization has not 
yielded the expected outcomes14 and state-owned enterprises are not detrimental to 
economic growth15. Still, unvarying privatization advice is continuously dished out by 
                                                        
5  M. Berne, and G. Pogorel, ‘Privatization Experiences in France’, Paper presented at CESifo 
Conference on Privatization Experiences in the EU, Cadenabbia, Italy, November 2003; These firms 
were privatized at various points between 1986 and 2000.  
6 J. Willner, ‘Privatization and State Ownership in Finland’ CESifo Working Paper, no. 1012, Ifo 
Institute for Economic Research, Munich, 2003.  
7  J. Toye, ‘Changing Perspectives in Development Economics’, In Rethinking Development 
Economics, H-J. Chang, (ed), Anthem Press, London, 2003. 
8 W. Megginson and J. Netter, ‘From state to market: A survey of empirical studies on privatisation’ 
Journal of Economic Literature. June 2001; S. Kikeri, and A.F. Kolo, ‘Privatization: trends and recent 
developments’ World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 3765, 2005. 
9 Although most of these countries have recently made policy reversals in this regard ; A. Estache, and 
L. Trujillo, ‘Privatization in Latin America’, in Privatization: Successes and failures, G. Roland (ed), 
Columbia University Press, New York, 2008, pp. 136-167. 
10 C. Cramer, ‘Privatization and adjustment in Mozambique: A ‘Hospital Pass?”, Journal of Southern 
African Studies, Vol 27, Issue 1, 2001. 
11 P. Bennell, ‘Privatization in sub-Saharan Africa: Progress and prospects during the 1990s’, World 
Development, 25(11), 1997, pp. 1785-1803; S. Kikeri, and A.F. Kolo, 2005. 
12 W. Megginson and J. Netter, 2001; Although a high percentage of privatization proceeds came from 
China, it has privatized mainly its public SMEs, leaving most large scale SOEs intact. 
13 S. Kikeri, and A.F. Kolo, 2005. 
14 A. McDonald, and G. Ruiters, eds. Alternatives to privatization: Public options for essential services 
in the global South. Routledge, 2012. 
15 H. Jalilian, and J. Weiss, ‘Policy Arena: Bureaucrats, Business and Economic Growth’, Journal of 
International Development.  Sep 1997 pp. 877-85. 
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multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and IMF as panacea for economies 
characterized by fiscal crises and underdeveloped markets.  Even within developing 
countries, there appears to be little resistance to it except from labor unions.  
This trend is not confined to academic scholarship. At a more popular level, it is 
interestingly captured in a 2012 issue of the Economist magazine, an unabashed 
evangelist of free markets. In its 21 January 2012 issue, the Economist magazine16 
wrote: 
 
State capitalism is on the march, overflowing with cash and emboldened by the crisis in the 
West. State companies make up 80% of the value of the stock market in China, 62% in Russia 
and 38% in Brazil. They accounted for one-third of the emerging world's foreign direct 
investment between 2003 and 2010 and an even higher proportion of its most spectacular 
acquisitions, as well as a growing proportion of the very largest firms. 
 
The magazine went on to declare that state capitalism increasingly looked like “the 
coming trend”. It wrote17:  
 
In the 1990s most state-owned companies were little more than government departments in 
emerging markets; the assumption was that, as the economy matured, the government would 
close or privatize them. Yet they show no signs of relinquishing the commanding heights, 
whether in major industries (the world's ten biggest oil-and-gas firms, measured by reserves, 
are all state-owned) or major markets. 
 
The magazine then goes on to suggest various reasons why despite their global 
success these SOEs might still be bad for national competitiveness because of the way 
they distort markets. It is this contradiction between advice and evidence that we 
explore in this paper. Specifically, we look into how the welcome mat for 
privatization continues to be rolled out even when the results are suboptimal. In 
particular, how does this process take place in developing countries characterized by 
increasingly neoliberal regulatory environments? We focus particularly on how 
privatizations are carried out to create rent-seeking regimes18 and ponder why there is 
little resistance.   
We illustrate these dynamics in the context of two major privatizations in a South 
Asian country, Pakistan. Pakistan is an interesting empirical site to learn about ways 
in which privatization, despite its numerous failures, is still cherished, because it is 
one of a set of developing countries that have whole-heartedly embraced 
neoliberalism and extensively implemented Washington Consensus policies. In the 
50s and 60s, Pakistan was held up as the poster-child for late development and 
considered at par with South Korea19. Since then, the two have followed markedly 
different development trajectories with Korea surging ahead and Pakistan losing its 
competitiveness drastically20. Since privatization drives have been a key plank of 
Pakistan’s economic policy, it is pertinent to analyze their antecedents and 
consequences. Furthermore, Pakistan’s experience with mass privatization is 
generalizable to many other developing countries that have followed ‘Washington 
                                                        
16 A. Wooldridge, ‘The visible hand: Special Report on State Capitalism’ Economist, January 21, 2012. 
17 Wooldridge 2012. 
18  W. Glade ‘Privatization in Rent-Seeking Societies’, World Development. May 1989 pp. 673-82. 
19 O. Noman, Economic and Social Progress in Asia: Why Pakistan Did Not Become a Tiger, Oxford 
University Press, Karachi, 1997. 
20 M. Khan, The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in Pakistan 1947-1971, SOAS, University of 
London, London, 1999. 
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Consensus’ policies21.   
Our cases include privatization of national banks, and introduction of private 
producers in the energy sector. Using a mix of painstakingly collected primary and 
secondary data, we analyze the outcomes of these privatizations and analyze why 
there hasn’t been more questioning of these suboptimal results. Specifically, we 
describe how the decidedly neoliberal policy regime and regulatory environment have 
allowed the socialization of losses and the privatization of profits. Our findings shed 
new light on the way in which privatization of SOEs is implicated in a South Asian 
country’s underdevelopment and the neoliberal environment that provides the rose 
tinted lens through which these reforms are viewed.   
 
All Carrots and No Sticks: Private profits, Socialized risk 
 
State Ownership of Corporations 
 
Why should the state own any corporations? After all, at least in theory, private 
companies operating under a combination of government regulation, tariff control 
and/or a subsidy scheme, could undertake most of the functions of SOEs22. This 
combination should be sufficient to ensure the appropriate incentives to control 
investment and prices. However, in practice, solutions involving regulation and 
subsidies often prove difficult to manage for developing countries lacking adequate 
resources and regulatory capacity. Moreover, provision of subsidies requires tax 
revenue, which many developing countries with weak states find difficult to raise23. 
Enforcement of complex regulations similarly requires dealing with legal 
maneuvering and political lobbying by powerful firms, which are often subsidiaries of 
well-resourced multinational corporations (MNCs)24.  
The writings of classical development theorists, such as Gerschenkron (1962)25, 
Nurske (1953)26, Rosenstien-Rodan (1943)27, and Hirschman (1958)28, make a case 
for SOEs involvement during certain stages of development. According to the 
Gerschenkron hypothesis, for instance, the later a country industrializes the more 
government involvement is required, because the state is the only institution with the 
resources to help overcome the difficulties of late industrialization. The argument is 
simple: private investors have an inherent bias towards short-term gains, and are 
especially risk averse in developing countries. These ‘capital market failures’ mean 
that the state needs to step in to finance large-scale, capital intensive projects which 
might be risky, and have long gestation periods, especially in key sectors of the 
                                                        
21 M. Andrews, “State-owned banks, Stability, Privatization, and Growth: practical policy decisions in a 
world without empirical proof.” International Monetary Fund working paper no. 5-10. 2005. 
22  H-J. Chang, Bad Samaritans: The myth of free trade and the secret history of capitalism, 
Bloomsbury Publishing, USA, 2007. 
23 J. Di John, ‘The political economy of taxation and tax reform in developing countries’ Research 
Paper (No. 2006/74), UNU-WIDER, United Nations University (UNU), 2006. 
24 Indeed, the difficulties advanced countries are facing today in getting their banks to provide loans to 
the real economy, rather than indulging in speculation, illustrates how even those with a high degree of 
state capacity can encounter these problems; Chang 2007. 
25  A. Gerschenkron, Economic backwardness in historical perspective, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass, 1962. 
26 Nurkse R. Problems of Capital Formation in Developing Countries, Columbia University Press, 
New York, 1953. 
27 P.N. Rosenstein-Rodan, ‘Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe’, The 
Economic Journal, 1943, pp. 202-211.  
28 A. Hirschman, The strategy of economic development, Yale university Press, New Haven, 1958. 
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economy, which are expected to initially make losses.  This can often the be case in 
the manufacturing sector, where such market failures are even more acute due to the 
large scale of investment required, and difficulties in technological upgrading, but 
which historically has been considered necessary for economic development29.  
The weight of historical evidence is certainly behind such arguments. As mentioned 
earlier, many successful late developers such as Korea, Taiwan and Singapore have 
had a substantial state owned sector during their rapid growth periods. Rather than 
inhibiting growth, evidence show that SOEs have played a crucial role in state-led 
development strategy 30 . Finally, SOEs have been used to deal with ‘natural 
monopoly’ situations, as well as equity issues – to make sure that essential services 
are provided to all citizens. Examples abound of SOEs that have gone on to become 
global leaders in their industries31.  
 
The Tide Turns 
 
In the 1970s and 80s, with the oil crisis and economic recession in the US, this trend 
began to reverse. Liberalization of trade, financial sector and labor markets was 
ushered in. Institutions such as the World Bank and global and local policy makers 
justified and legitimized this shift that came to be known as the ‘Washington 
Consensus’32. The consensus derived its legitimacy from the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the domino effect that followed in Eastern Europe. With Thatcher in the 
UK and Reagan in the US, a paradigmatic shift took place away from Keynesian 
thinking and the free market mantra was preached with evangelical zeal.  
A spate of privatizations followed around the world, in particular Eastern Europe.  
The privatization campaigns were accompanied by a host of justifications. Some of 
the prominent ones included improving efficiency in the privatized industries, 
reducing the fiscal deficit, easing public sector pay determination by weakening 
public sector unions, and widening share ownership33.  
 
These privatizations had to typically face a lot of resistance from unions and 
bureaucracies. While such resistance was quelled it did little to legitimize 
privatization as a desired strategy. This was acknowledged by the chief evangelist of 
privatizations, the World Bank, in its 1995 Bureaucrats in Business Report34 in which 
it stated that in order to push these privatizations through, an approach other than 
direct force needed to be taken.  
This approach turned out to be primarily discursive, where privatization was 
constructed to be an unquestionably desirable strategy whatever the conditions. By 
                                                        
29 N. Kaldor, ‘Strategic Factors In Economic Development’, New York, Ithaca, 1967; A.P. Thirlwall, 
The Nature of Economic Growth: A Alternative Framework for Understanding the Performance of 
Nations, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2003; H-J. Chang, Kicking away the ladder: development strategy 
in historical perspective. Anthem Press, 2002. 
30  Chang and Grabel 2004; R.Wade, Governing the market: Economic theory and the role of 
government in East Asian industrialization, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1990; A. Amsden, 
Asia's next giant: South Korea and late industrialization, Oxford University Press,1989; Shin 2005; 
Chang 2007 
31 H-J. Chang, ‘Public Investment Management’, National Development Strategy Policy Guidance 
Note, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs and United Nations Development 
Programme, 2006; Amsden 1989. 
32 Toye 2003. 
33 J. Vickers and G. Yarrow, Privatisation: An Economic Analysis, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1988. 
34 World Bank, Bureaucrats and Business: The Economics and Politics of Government Ownership, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995. 
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the mid-90s privatization was presented as an unquestionably beneficial end in itself, 
and a panacea for all sorts of economic problems, including alleviating short-term 
fiscal problems, improving competition in privatized industries, maximizing domestic 
private sector development, increasing domestic ownership of productive assets, and 
even reducing income inequalities35. It was argued that SOEs contributed to increased 
deficits and inflation, which reduced economic growth36. Finally, it was claimed that 
privatization would reduce corruption and bureaucracy, and could even provide a 
solution to improving social services such as health and education37.  
 
The Elimination of Sticks and Proliferation of Carrots 
 
The move to present privatization as a panacea was contextualized in a larger rise of 
neoliberal economic policies, including financial, trade, and labour market 
deregulation and liberalization. This often meant a re-presentation of economic 
history. Thus, India and China’s rising competitiveness was entirely attributed by 
eminent economists to the rise of the private sector (see for example Naughton 
200738; Bhagwati and Panagariya 201339) and the ‘roll back’ of the state. The broad 
based industrialization that took place in both countries prior to liberalization was 
portrayed not as the foundation on which subsequent progress took place but as ‘lost 
years’ where inefficiency and corruption impeded the progress that could have been 
made. 
During the 1950s, 60s and 70s, successful developmental states used a carrot and 
stick policy with business interests40. This almost always involved the creation of 
rents41, or ‘carrots’ for capitalists by the state, in return for the capitalists performing 
a certain economic or social function (the ‘stick’), and withdrawal of the carrots if 
they did not42. For example, in Korea, some ‘carrots’ provided by the state included 
government guarantees, soft loans, tax breaks, export subsidies, while the 
                                                        
35 O. Bouin, ‘The Privatization in Developing Countries: Reflections on a Panacea’, OECD Policy 
Brief 3, 1992. http://www.oecd.org/dev/1918716.pdf [accessed, 20 March 2015]; A. Galal, L. Jones, P. 
Tandon, and I. Vogelsang, Welfare Consequences of Selling Public Enterprises: Case Studies from 
Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, and the UK, World Bank, Washington, 1992; S. Kikeri, J. Nellis and M. 
Shirley, Privatisation: The Lessons of Experience, Washington DC, World Bank, 1992. 
36 World Bank 1995. 
37 K. Bayliss and B. Fine, ‘Beyond Bureaucrats in Business: a critical review of the World Bank 
approach to privatization and public sector reform’, Journal of International Development, 10(7), 1998, 
pp. 41-855; K. Bayliss and C. Cramer, ‘Privatization and the Post-Washington Consensus: in between 
the lab and the real world’, in Development Policy in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond the Post-
Washington Consensus, B. Fine, C. Lapavitsas and J. Pincus, Routeledge, London, 2001. 
38 B. Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth, MIT Press, Cambridge Mass, 2007. 
39 J. Bhagwati, J. N. Bhagwati, and A. Panagariya, ‘Why growth matters: How economic growth in 
India reduced poverty and the lessons for other developing countries’. Public Affairs, 2013. 
40 Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; M. Woo-Cumings, The developmental state. Cornell University Press, 
1999; Chang 2002; L. Weiss. States in the global economy: Bringing domestic institutions back in, 
Cambridge University Press, 2003; A. Kohli. State-directed development: political power and 
industrialization in the global periphery, Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
41 Defined by Khan 2000 p. 1 as ‘excess income’ which may take the form of f higher rates of return in 
monopolies, the extra income from politically organized transfers such as subsidies, or the extra 
income which comes from owning scarce resources, whether natural resources or specialized 
knowledge.  
42 M. Khan, ‘Rents, Efficiency, and Growth’ in Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: 
Theory and Evidence in Asia,  Khan, M.H. and Jomo K.S. (ed) Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press. 2000; V. Chibber, ‘Building a Developmental State: the Korean case reconsidered’. Politics and 
Society. 1999 Sep 1;27:309-46; A. Amsden, The rise of the rest: challenges to the west from late-
industrializing economies. Oxford University Press, 2001. 
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corresponding ‘sticks’ included state direction of investment decisions, meeting 
export quotas and performance standards, etc43. Strong states, that had the ability to 
enforce this ‘disciplinary mechanism’44 on business, had the most economic success.  
Privatization, in the absence of a state with the capacity to ‘discipline’ business 
interests, has only created fresh opportunities for private profits, while shifting the 
bulk of associated risk to the public sector, and therefore to the taxpayer. Carrots have 
proliferated while sticks have been eliminated. According to Harvey (2007)45  the 
primary aim of privatization in the neoliberal era “has been to open up new fields for 
capital accumulation in domains formerly regarded off-limits to the calculus of 
profitability”46. Put another way, it seems to have become easier to privatize the 
profits while socializing the risks.  
 
It is in this context that we seek to examine privatizations in a South Asian country 
with a state that is widely perceived to be weak. The case of Pakistan allows us to 
explore how after the change from a developmentalist economic model to a neoliberal 
one47, the state is able to privatize profits while socializing the risks. The aim of the 
study is to see how the socialization of risks and privatization of profits is carried out 
in the course of privatization, and how the context and discourse facilitates it. The 
study is important because systematically collected empirical evidence on 
privatizations in developing countries is rare simply due to the unavailability of 
information that one takes for granted in developed countries. Indeed, much of the 
evidence is collected and presented by multilateral agencies that have been the chief 
proponents of privatization in the first place. We hope that our empirical analysis of 
two of the most significant privatizations in Pakistan will provide an alternative view 
that challenges some of the orthodoxies in economic reform packages and sheds new 
light on the process by which privatization has enabled private interests to obtain 
state-sponsored carrots, without receiving any of the associated sticks.  
 
Methods 
 
Research Context 
 
Both of our studies of privatization are situated in Pakistan. There are at least two 
reasons why we think Pakistan provides a fertile empirical site to study the 
antecedents and consequences of privatization in the third world. First, given the 
‘neoliberalization’ of Pakistan’s economy48, it offers an excellent context in which to 
study the dynamics that facilitate and encourage the privatization of profits and 
socialization of risk in privatizations. Secondly, sufficient time has elapsed since the 
privatization of the two sectors under study to allow us to examine the effects on 
performance of the firm as well as on the economy.  
 
Data collection and analysis 
                                                        
43  Amsden 1989; H-J. Chang, ‘The political economy of industrial policy in Korea’. Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 1993, pp. 131-157. 
44 Amsden 1989; 2001. 
45 D. Harvey, ‘Neoliberalism as creative destruction.’ The Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science 610.1, 2007, pp. 21-44. 
46 Harvey 2007 p. 35. 
47 A. Zaidi, Issues in Pakistan’s Economy, second edition, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2005. 
48 A. Zaidi 2015, Issues in Pakistan’s Economy: A Political Economy Perspective, Oxford University 
Press, Karachi, 2015. 
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In this section, we briefly describe how data was collected and analyzed for the two 
studies.  
 
Privatization of the energy sector 
Until the mid-1980s, Pakistan’s energy needs were met by the Water and Power 
Development Authority (WAPDA) and Karachi Electric Supply Company (KESC), 
the two public sector organizations responsible for the generation, transmission, and 
distribution of electricity. Both were faring quite well49. Electricity was produced 
primarily through hydropower projects, keeping the production cost minimal. Since 
the cost of production and demand were low, so inevitably were the subsidies in 
absolute terms. 
By the mid 1980s, increasing demand for electricity and WAPDA’s inability to 
keep pace with it began to result in energy shortages and load shedding. Entering the 
1990s, Pakistan was planning to increase its existing generation capacity for power 
production. However, instead of increasing public investments in energy, the World 
Bank encouraged the Pakistani government to privatize the sector before increasing 
capacity. In 1994, Pakistan announced its privatization policy, and since then, many 
private sector power projects have been installed. Despite this, however, the country 
faces chronic shortages and increasing tariffs.  
The first author started investigating this case in collaboration with a highly 
experienced professional who had managed power projects in Pakistan and other 
countries. He had been involved in some of these privatization deals as an investment 
banker as well. Our examination of this case soon took us to a variety of stakeholders 
including senior figures in WAPDA, the National Transmission and Dispatch 
Company (NTDC), distribution companies (DISCOS), and various bankers who had 
been involved in structuring the deals. Much information was also gleaned from 
secondary sources including reports published by various aid agencies, multilateral 
agencies and the government. Early empirical findings were published with another 
collaborator and comments on those helped us refine our analysis further.  
 
Privatization of the banking sector 
 
Until the 1980s, Pakistan had a typically ‘repressed’ financial system, with a system 
of credit planning, lending targets, directed credit schemes, and regulated interest 
rates. Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) and specialized banks existed to 
provide the bulk of long-term credit and credit to neglected sectors, while five large 
nationalized commercial banks (NCBs) played a supporting role, providing mainly 
trade and working capital finance50. Financial liberalization and deregulation began in 
earnest in 1988 under IMF’s structural adjustment program. Gradually, all major 
nationalized banks were privatized with only National Bank of Pakistan (NBP) left in 
the public sector51. 
We set out to examine how the role of the banking sector in the economy changed 
                                                        
49 A. Malik, ‘Power crisis in Pakistan: A crisis in governance?’, PIDE Monograph Series, Pakistan 
Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad, Pakistan, 2012 p. 2. 
50 Zaidi 2005 pp. 263-270; A. Janjua, History of the State Bank of Pakistan (1977-88), State Bank 
Printing Press, Karachi, 2003. 
51 Zaidi 2005 pp. 336-345; A. Janjua, A, History of the State Bank of Pakistan (1988-2003), State Bank 
Printing Press, Karachi, 2004. 
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after privatization. This involved utilizing both firm level and macroeconomic data, as 
well as 33 semi-structured interviews with policy makers, regulators, senior and 
junior level private bank employees, and ex-DFI employees. The interviews were 
used to triangulate our findings, as well as to shed light on causality in some cases. 
While previous studies on bank privatization usually compare the firm level 
performance of public versus private banks in terms of profitability, efficiency, and 
capital adequacy ratios, we use different assessment criteria. Given that the function 
of the national financial system is to provide credit, at adequate levels and prices to 
the relevant sectors of the economy, rather than to create profits for a small number of 
shareholders, firm level performance according to shareholder criteria is, at best, of 
secondary importance when assessing the banking sector’s contribution to the 
economy.  Therefore, we compare the behavior of the five largest privatized 
commercial banks pre and post privatization in relation to their effect on the wider 
economy, in terms of their loan maturity, the sectorial distribution of their lending, 
and their cost to the taxpayer.  
The historical firm level data (from 1972 till 1996) was collected from company 
accounts in the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) archives, where it was only available in 
hardcopy. From 1996 onwards data was more easily available on the SBP and 
company websites. Various financial ratios were calculated and analyzed using this 
data. Any anomalies in the data were understood using the relevant notes from the 
company accounts, and SBP annual reports from the relevant time periods. 
Macroeconomic or aggregate bank level data all comes either from the SBP, in some 
cases from their publicly available online data base, and in others through contacts at 
the SBP, from the World Bank Development Indicators, or from the Pakistan 
Economy Survey.  Parts of our analysis appeared in the Economic and Political 
Weekly and were circulated widely to policy makers and bankers, who personally 
agreed with our analysis, if not with our implied policy conclusions.  
 
Findings: Privatization of Energy and Banking 
 
The ‘neoliberalization’ of Pakistan 
 
Before we delve into the two particular cases of privatization, it is important to note 
the sea change that came about in Pakistan the late 1980s and early 1990s. As 
mentioned above, following the fall of the Berlin wall and disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, free market policies swept across the globe. Pakistan was no exception. Its 
dependency on the IMF further acted as a catalyst in this process with the IMF’s 
structural adjustment program (SAP) enforcing dramatic changes in various parts of 
the economy52. Around 1989, Pakistan started on a road that led to reductions in 
public expenditure, more open trade, liberalization of the economy, and 
privatization53.  
The free market paradigm, which did not allow for any state interference in trade or 
domestic industry, and which was actively pushed by multilateral agencies, gradually 
came to be entrenched in Pakistan. Both academic and policy making circles soon 
came to reflect this new consensus.  The ascendancy of neoliberal thinking in 
Pakistan’s policies becomes clearly visible if one takes a look at the changes in key 
positions in government.  In the central bank, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), 
                                                        
52 Zaidi 2015. 
53 Ibid p. 457. 
 12 
between 1947 and the late 1970s, the first six governors had had a domestic banking 
or civil service backgrounds. The next five governors had loose affiliations with the 
IFIs, for instance, holdings consultancy assignments, or attending training courses. 
From 1993 to 2009, however, the next three appointees, Muhammad Yaqub, Ishrat 
Hussain and Shamshad Akhtar had previously made their careers in the IMF, World 
Bank, and Asian Development Bank respectively, showing a clear pattern. This was 
followed by the appointment of international investment bankers as governors. An 
examination of the backgrounds of finance ministers reveals similar trends. Before the 
1980s, Finance Ministers tended to be domestically educated career civil servants or 
lawyers. From the 1990s onwards several ministers were appointed with World Bank 
or Citibank backgrounds, including Citibanker Shaukat Aziz who went on to become 
Prime Minister. 
This transformation of the policy regime had already started when privatizations 
began in Pakistan in the early 1990s, and was further consolidated throughout the 
2000s. This essentially meant that privatization was coming to be seen as an end in 
itself rather than a means to an end. This becomes clear from how the two 
privatizations that we describe were conceived, carried out, and evaluated. Below, we 
detail our findings into the two cases of privatization.  
 
Privatization of the Energy Sector 
 
Pretext for Privatization 
 
With encouragement and financing from the World Bank, Pakistan took the first step 
towards privatizing its energy sector in the 198554. A committee was formed by the 
Economic Coordination Committee of the Cabinet (ECC) in July 1985, which 
strongly recommended private sector involvement in expanding energy capacity as a 
solution to the ongoing energy shortages. It was explicitly stated in their report that 
power generation was seen as a convenient area for private sector participation, in 
order to further the broader agenda of increasing the role of the private sector, and 
decreasing that of the public sector in the economy55. 
In the years that followed, a number of influential reports by transnational 
organizations, such as the World Bank and USAID, contributed to further portraying 
WAPDA and KESC as inherently inefficient, poorly managed, and overly complex 
SOEs. According to the 2010 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), these public 
sector oligopolies were “large, monolithic, vertically integrated utilities with 
overstaffing, financial and technical inefficiencies, and a lack of competitive spirit”56.  
According to an article in the Dawn newspaper in 2002, WAPDA and KESC 
“continue to bleed financially despite regular pumping of billions of rupees into them 
by successive governments”57. The public sector was portrayed as inherently unable 
to carry out infrastructure development on the required scale due to resource 
constraints, lack of sufficient institutional capacity and lack of technical expertise58. 
                                                        
54 J. Fraser, ‘Lessons from the independent private power experience in Pakistan’, Energy and Mining 
Sector Board Discussion Paper No. 14, Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2005. 
55 A. Saleem, The State Under Trial: An Institutional Analysis of a Policy Decision in the Pakistan 
Electricity Sector, Dissertation submitted to Lahore University of Management Sciences, 2014. 
56 International Monetary Fund. ‘Pakistan: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper’. IMF Country Report 
No. 10/183. 2010. Washington DC. 
57 Dawn, ‘Wapda, Kesc draining resources’, Dawn, 2002,  
http://www.dawn.com/news/51138/wapda-kesc-draining-resources [accessed 01 Feb 2016]. 
58 Saleem 2014. 
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Specifically, it was argued that the current generation and provision mechanism was 
marred with inefficiencies and corruption, which necessitated provision of subsidies 
in order to make power affordable to consumers. Privatization would (i) lead to better, 
wider, more reliable service delivery and (ii) free up government resources to spend 
on health and education. It was also argued that cutting subsidies would be good 
because they were not helping the poor anyway as they were mostly not connected to 
the grid59. Finally, the involvement of private sector IPPs was also justified on the 
basis that this would boost “competition for and in the market for electricity 
supply”60. Government guarantees for these IPPs were justified as necessary to “help 
to gradually develop competition in the power sector by creating the necessary 
environment for attracting investment”61. 
 
The Privatization Process 
 
Pakistan’s privatization experiment with the energy sector began with the new 1994 
Power Policy. The terms on which investors were invited to set up generation 
capacity in the country were some of the most generous in the world. Structurally, it 
was built on a cost-plus-return 62  basis in US dollar terms. Investors were to be 
provided a US dollar-based internal rate of return of 15 to 18 per cent per year over 
the 25 to 30-year-period of the power purchase agreement after covering for 
operational costs. This was further backed by sovereign guarantees from the 
Government of Pakistan. The Independent Power Producers (IPPs) were to be paid 
every month in two parts, i.e., a ‘capacity payment’ and an ‘energy payment’. The 
‘capacity payment’ reimbursed the IPP for all the fixed costs of the power plant, 
including debt servicing (which at an allowance of 80:20 debt-equity ratio proved to 
be very high) and provided the investor’s equity return on top. These payments were 
to be made irrespective of whether or not the IPP was asked to produce electricity. 
The ‘energy payment’ reimbursed the IPP for all variable costs of production, e.g., 
fuel costs, regardless of the type of fuel employed and its market price. All payments 
were indexed (if relevant) to the USD/PKR exchange rate and inflation (local or 
foreign) changes.  
Furthermore, IPPs were exempted from corporate income tax, customs duties, sales 
tax, and other surcharges on imported equipment. Permission was also granted for 
power generation companies to issue corporate bonds and shares at discounted prices 
(Fraser 2005). It was no surprise that the then United States Secretary of Energy, 
Hazel O’Leary, described it as “the best energy policy in the whole world”63. 
Three things were noticeable about this policy. First, though it offered highly 
generous returns, it provided no incentives to make the plant design efficient. In fact, 
since the government paid for all operational costs, many thermal IPPs understated 
their efficiency. Second, the policy was fuel blind, which meant investors were free to 
set up furnace oil based thermal IPPs (the most expensive fuel option) with the 
government still covering the cost of the fuel. Finally, with the government 
guaranteeing returns to investors, there was effectively no competition in the market, 
                                                        
59 Fraser 2005.  
60 International Monetary Fund. ‘Pakistan: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper’. IMF Country Report 
No. 04/24. 2004. Washington DC p. 44. 
61 Ministry of Water and Power, 2008, cited in IMF 2010 p.138. 
62 This means the government promised to cover all expenses in addition to guaranteeing a generous 
profit on top. 
63 C. Hill, ‘Power failure’ Institutional Investor, November, 1999. 
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again engendering inefficiency. How this policy got adopted was explained by a 
leading banker involved in the deal:  
 
We had been trying for years but the WAPDA people and bureaucrats had been resisting 
us. Then the World Bank leaned on the government, basically telling them that any loans 
would be conditional on privatization. That’s how we got moving again64. 
 
Outcome 
 
The outcome of the privatization policy was perhaps predictable. The highly generous 
deals that the government offered to investors meant that for every hypothetical but 
typical 100 MW thermal (oil-fired) power plant in the private sector, the government 
would end up spending US $21.42 million more than it would in the public sector 
over the life of the power project (for a detailed analysis see Munir and Khalid 
201265). With most of the investors setting up thermal units, the country became 
hostage to rising oil prices – this led to massive debts that had to be cleared through 
more borrowing. 
A longer term and highly damaging consequence of the private power policy was 
the fuel mix it engendered. In the 1980s, the country’s electricity generation relied on 
a fuel mix of approximately 60:40 in favor of hydropower versus thermal. This 
changed dramatically over the next decade with the fuel mix going to 30 per cent 
hydropower and almost 70 per cent thermal by the end of 2010.  
As Munir and Khalid (2012) show, contrary to claims of inefficiency in the public 
sector power plants, the average blended cost of public sector plants was actually 
lower than the IPPs. Unfortunately, as a result of the policy, 52 per cent of power 
came to be purchased by the government from IPPs (supplying at a higher cost). The 
downstream effect of shortages and higher tariffs was significant. By 2011, industrial 
output was down by up to 37 percent 66  with numerous factories and businesses 
closing down due to shortages and the excessive cost of deploying small generators.  
 
Privatization of Major Banks 
 
Pretext for Privatization 
 
In the late 1980s, the pre-reform financial system in Pakistan came under criticism by 
both domestic policy makers and IFIs (see for example Hussain 200567; State Bank of 
Pakistan 200268; Ul Haque 199769) for a number of reasons. These included crowding 
out of the private sector, causing a large budget deficit, low bank profitability and 
                                                        
64 Interview with first author. 
65  K. Munir and S. Khalid, ‘Pakistan’s Power Crisis: How did we get here?’ Lahore Journal of 
Economics, September 2012, pp. 73-82. 
66 R. Siddiqui, H. Jalil, M. Nasir, W.S. Malik, and M. Khalid, ‘The cost of unserved energy: Evidence 
from selected industrial cities of Pakistan’, Working Paper No. 2011:75, Pakistan Institute of 
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67 I. Hussain, ‘Why privatisation is necessary for economic growth in Pakistan?’,  Address at the 11th 
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Club, Karachi, 12 August 2005.  http://www.bis.org/review/r050829c.pdf [accessed 20 March 2015] 
68 State Bank of Pakistan Research Department, Pakistan: Financial sector assessment 2001-2002, 
2002 http://www.sbp.org.pk/publications/fsa-2001-2002/index.htm [accessed 20 March 2015] 
69 N. Ul Haque, ‘Financial market reform in Pakistan’, The Pakistan Development Review, 36:4 II, 
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efficiency, a high degree of concentration in the banking sector, inadequate provision 
of credit to small and medium enterprises and ‘political lending’ leading to a high 
number of non-performing loans.  Some of these criticisms were justifiable, especially 
those related to concentration and SME lending, however, on the whole, the financial 
sector was functional, providing adequate amounts of credit to key sectors such as 
manufacturing and agriculture at reasonable cost70.  
In line with the overall policy direction, privatization of banks was recommended 
as a remedy for all of these problems. It was argued, amongst other things, that 
privatization would lead to greater competition in the banking sector, improve firm 
level performance, and improve savings mobilization71.  Following privatization and 
the dismantlement of interest rate controls and credit ceilings, greater bank level 
efficiency and profitability would not only be a good in and of itself, but also improve 
the governments’ fiscal position. It was argued that this would free up resources for 
spending on physical and social infrastructure72.  
Apart from this, according to interviews with senior SBP officials and ex officials, 
it was argued that private banks would reduce ‘political lending’ and as a result non-
performing loans (NPLs) would decrease, leading to a better risk assessment and 
more optimal allocation of resources. Furthermore, it was argued that private 
investment would increase as the public sector withdrew, reducing ‘crowding out’. 
The nationalized commercial banks (NCBs) had to hold 30 per cent of their portfolio 
in government debt at a fixed, low interest rate. According to a retired senior SBP 
official, it was argued that if these controls were lifted, the banks would reduce their 
holdings of government debt, which were making them unprofitable, and instead 
increase lending to the real economy and especially to neglected sectors such as 
agriculture and SMEs. 
 
The Privatization Process 
 
The privatizations began with the sale of Muslim Commercial Bank (MCB), which 
was sold for Rs. 2.4 billion (US $ 97million73) in 1991 to a group led by industrialist 
Mian Mansha, a close ally of then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. That this was a ‘fire 
sale’ was evident from the fact that only after a few years MCBs profits were higher 
than its sale price74.  Next came the privatization of Allied Bank Limited (ABL), sold 
first in 1991 to the Employees Management group, and after going into negative 
equity and being re-nationalized, re-sold to a private group for Rs. 11 billion (US $ 
185 million) in 200475.  
Next, 51 percent of United Bank Limited’s (UBL) shares were sold in 2002 to a 
consortium of foreign investors including UK based cash and carry chain Bestway 
and the Abu Dhabi group, a UAE private equity fund. Rather than generating a 
windfall for the government, the sale resulted in a net drain of Rs. 8.65 billion (US 
                                                        
70 Janjua 2003. 
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$148 million) - even though the bank was sold at Rs. 12.35 billion (US $ 212 million), 
the government had previously injected Rs. 21 billion (US $360 million) in equity in 
order to improve its performance in preparation for sale. Furthermore, the bidding 
process was not transparent, as parties were allowed to raise their bids after the initial 
round76. 
UBL’s privatization was followed by that of the country’s largest bank, Habib Bank 
Limited (HBL). HBL was sold in 2003 for Rs. 22.4 billion (US $390 million), after 
giving it an equity injection of Rs. 18 billion (US $ 313 million). Moreover, benefits 
worth Rs. 18.84 billion (US $320 million), including income tax refunds and a 
transfer of bad debts to the government owned Corporate and Industrial Restructuring 
Corporation (CIRC), were announced after three bidders had already been shortlisted, 
violating the auction rules 77 . In effect, the oldest, largest, and most established 
Pakistani bank - which accounted for over 20 per cent of Pakistan’s total banking 
operations and boasted an extensive international network of branches in 26 different 
countries - was privatized at a loss of Rs. 14.44 billion (US $251million)78. To top it 
off, it was given to the Agha Khan Fund, a non-corporate entity with no expertise in 
banking.  
 
Outcome 
 
The few empirical studies that have been done on bank efficiency pre-and-post 
privatization show no clear improvement in efficiency79 . However, as shown by 
Munir and Naqvi (2013)80, bank profitability increased dramatically post-privatization 
even when overall economic growth was sluggish.  
As Munir and Naqvi (2013) point out, a closer look at the sources of bank 
profitability reveals that this increase came at the expense of the real economy. An 
examination of the data on net interest margins for the large five banks shows that 
profitability coincided with an increase in interest rate spreads following interest rate 
deregulation; a factor independent from bank efficiency or risk assessment. Lending 
rates doubled for the big five banks from seven per cent to 14 per cent between 2004 
and 2007. Deposit rates however, remained low, with the interest rate spread 
(difference in lending and deposit rates) in Pakistan between 2004 and 2010 
averaging over 6 percent compared to 2per cent in Korea and 3per cent in Malaysia 
for the same period81.   
 Despite high lending interest rates, banks made such large profits not through 
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increased lending to the real economy based on improved risk assessment ability as 
had been predicted, but through dramatically increasing their investment in high 
yielding government debt. This was confirmed during interviews with three separate 
high-level policy makers at the SBP in charge of regulating the banking system. This 
is all the more ironic given that one of the reasons for privatization was that it would 
reduce bank holdings of government debt. Whereas in the pre-reform system, NCBs 
had to hold 30 per cent of their assets in government bonds at a low fixed rates of four 
to six per cent82, long after privatization, the same banks held even more government 
paper, only, at much higher interest rates of about 12 to 13 per cent. The SBP noted 
that at the end of 2012, the share of government securities in total investments of the 
banking sector was 88.7 per cent83. 
According to the CEO of one privatized commercial bank in April 2012 “the 
Treasury Department [which deals with investment in government securities] is 
currently the most active department in the whole bank, and this is not a good thing 
[for the Pakistani economy]”. Interviews with privatized commercial bank (PCB) 
senior employees indicated that high investment in government bonds were justified 
as a result of a ‘lack of demand for corporate loans’ from firms, due to the general 
post-2007 economic downturn, as well as the negative economic impact of the energy 
crisis. For example, one PCB CEO noted that the rationale behind such high levels of 
investment in government securities was that “due to the lack of other investment 
opportunities, we have lots of excess cash. The risk for the bank is exactly the same if 
we hold cash, or T-bills, so it makes sense to hold T-bills which give a much higher 
return”. 
Given the unproductive investments made by banks, it is unsurprising that post-
privatization lending fell dramatically to its lowest level since 196384. As of 2014, 
Pakistan’s financial institutions only provided 49 per cent of domestic credit (up from 
a low of 42.7 per cent in 2011), compared to 143 per cent in Malaysia, 110 per cent in 
Brazil, and 163 per cent in China85. What little lending there was took the form of 
working capital or trade finance, rather than long term finance for investment in 
improving productive capacity86. According to figures released by the SBP, out of the 
total amount of lending as of May 2015, about 61 per cent is extended for short term 
working capital or trade finance, and only 1.5 per cent for long term investment 
finance, with the rest going towards small loans or lending for the purpose of 
purchasing and discounting bills87. According to a senior PCB executive “there is 
very little long term finance available because no bank is willing to take the risk in 
this environment”.  
Furthermore, the sectorial distribution of credit also worsened with agricultural 
lending falling as a percentage of GDP. Lending to manufacturing, which is vital for 
industrial development, which had been at almost 50 per cent of total lending in the 
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1970s88, declined as well, with the exception of a brief spike in lending to textiles, 
which resulted in many NPLs89. The financial sector reforms did not do much to 
improve competition either, despite this being one of their major stated aims. The 
banking sector still remained highly concentrated, with the five largest commercial 
banks accounting for 60 per cent of deposits and 80 per cent of profits in the banking 
sector at the end of 201290. Lack of competition was exemplified by the fact that 
rather than raising deposit rates to compete for customer deposits, the large five banks 
were able to keep them low, earning high spreads91 . According to a senior SBP 
policymaker, the SBP had to partially reverse liberalization reforms due to PCBs’ 
‘ridiculously low’ deposit rates, and impose a deposit floor of five per cent in 2008.  
Discussions with senior SBP policymakers also suggest that the large five commercial 
banks were able to form a ‘cartel’ to squeeze government during auctions in order to 
keep yields high as they were the primary dealers. 
 
Discussion: Privatization of Profits and Socialization of Losses 
 
In both the cases described above, it is clear that privatization was carried out in a 
way which led to the privatization of profits but socialization of losses. Particular 
interests were advanced in the name of universal ones, and carrots extended without 
corresponding sticks. The case of energy is straightforward. A rent-seeking regime 
was set up in the name of privatization. All risk remained with the taxpayer while 
lucrative returns were guaranteed to the investors. Given that most of the new 
capacity was furnace oil based, and oil prices went from US $20 to US $120 in this 
period, the government had to keep buying power from private producers at higher 
and higher prices. This expense was passed on to the consumer through higher tariffs 
and taxes (imposed on various goods to generate revenue to pay). Ordinary citizens 
also paid indirectly when rampant energy shortages caused by the state’s inability to 
buy expensive power from the IPPs became one of the major drags on economic 
growth. 
The case of banking was similar. The interest banks charge borrowers is supposed 
to be a reward for the risk the bank takes in case of possible defaults, while a bank’s 
profits are justified on account of the risks banks take in selecting good projects to 
which to lend to. In the case of the privatized commercial banks, it is clear that the 
shareholders of privatized banks (including foreign investors) were profiting from 
investment in risk-free government bonds, rather than through making risky 
investments in the real economy.  
While one of the main arguments for privatization and liberalization was that 
reforms would reduce the government’s fiscal burden, by providing ‘market 
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discipline’, the data indicates that the reforms have contributed to just the opposite92.  
As a result of the government shifting to market-based borrowing in the 1990s, as part 
of the process of interest rate liberalization and bond market development, yields on 
government securities increased dramatically, as mentioned earlier. While high 
interest rates made banks profitable, they also contributed to bringing the government 
further and further into debt. The government became trapped in a vicious circle post-
2007, where it borrowed from the commercial banks in order to fund interest 
payments, which went back mainly to the commercial banks themselves (commercial 
banks owned 70 per cent of government securities at the end of 2014, while domestic 
interest payments made up 92 per cent of all interest payments93. The government was 
stuck in a vicious circle, where it was now forced to borrow from the commercial 
banks in order to fund its interest payments, which went back to the commercial 
banks themselves. As debt service was prioritized over other expenditures by 
policymakers and IFIs, state capacity to undertake long-term public investment, and 
spending on social and physical infrastructure suffered. The ultimate loser was the 
taxpayer, who not only funded banks profits, but lost out on the economic advantages 
banks were supposed to bring in exchange.   
Apart from direct costs, indirect ones were also inflicted on taxpayers through 
power shortages and drying up of credit. The World Bank Investment Climate Survey 
(2007) listed electricity as the most serious perceived constraint, followed by 
macroeconomic and political instability 94 . The Global Competitiveness Report 
2014/15 ranked Pakistan 133 out of 144 in terms of quality of electricity supply, even 
below its overall infrastructure rank of 11395. About 95 per cent of manufacturing 
firms reported power outages, and figures for financial losses due to outages almost 
doubled between 2002 and 200796. A high percentage of firms were forced to rely on 
privately owned, oil based generators though the unit cost of power from a generator 
was much higher than that from the public grid97.  
In contrast, during the same period the governments of countries like India and 
China were drawing their power from coal (which comprised about 70 per cent and 
60 per cent of coal in the energy mix respectively). Pakistan, on the other hand was 
using only 6.5 per cent coal (despite possessing one of the largest reserves of coal in 
the world), relying heavily on oil instead98. 
Privatizing the major banks dried up the long-term finance needed for the 
upgrading of the productive structure. Historically, countries that have developed 
rapidly, including Korea, Taiwan, China, and Brazil, have mobilized their financial 
sectors to service development by directing them to provide large amounts of credit 
for those sectors deemed important for long-term economic development. The post-
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privatization financial sector in Pakistan played exactly the opposite role. The 
inability of the financial sector in Pakistan to provide credit to the productive sectors 
of the economy, while diverting resources instead to unproductive investments in 
government bonds and consumer finance, posed a severe constraint on economic 
development. The 2013 Investment Climate Survey shows that Pakistani 
manufacturing firms finance 86.5 per cent of investment through retained earnings, 
and only 2.4 per cent through banks, far lower than the regional average of 20per 
cent99 . Interviews conducted with industrialists, policy makers and bank officials 
unanimously suggest that the situation has become especially dire after the bursting of 
the post-9/11 bubble in 2008. According to the owner of a large industrial 
conglomerate “Even for me it is difficult to get a loan, the banks are only giving loans 
to large blue chips [companies] that are already customers, or to the military”. 
On the whole, industrial growth was much higher in the 1970s and 80s than it has 
been in the post-reform era, even during the boom period of 2001-2008100. Although 
GDP growth in Pakistan has been comparable with other developing countries, 
investment in the manufacturing sector has been low in comparison101. High energy 
costs and lack of availability of finance led to a lack of industrial investment, which 
contributed to the stagnation of manufacturing, the erosion of Pakistan’s heavy 
industrial base, and a decline in export competitiveness after the 1980s102. Pakistan’s 
share of manufacturing in GDP now pales in comparison to the Newly Industrialized 
Asian countries (South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and Indonesia), which started 
industrialization in the same time period (1960s) as Pakistan 103 . Manufacturing 
growth rates have fallen to an all-time low in the post 2007 period, at about two per 
cent per year104. 
 
Evaluating Privatization in the Land of Believers 
 
But all this is not what the privatizations were evaluated on. In both cases, any 
opposition at the intellectual or policy level was conspicuous by its absence. To be 
sure, there were numerous popular protests against privatization, especially from 
unionized workers in both the public banks and utilities companies. Public employees 
accused the banks of sacking thousands of lower ranking workers, while hiring highly 
paid senior management (often from foreign banks) at the same time105. In the case of 
energy, public sector utilities workers expressed their anger during various protests, 
demanding that privatization be cancelled, trade union activities be restored, and 
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contractual employees be given permanent contracts106. According to the protestors, 
privatization was being pushed through by the IFIs, but was against the interests of 
low-income Pakistanis, as it would result in a rise in the price of basic utilities and the 
loss of thousands of jobs107. However, although they sometimes caused delays, these 
popular protests were ultimately not strong enough to halt the tide of privatizations, 
and privatization had the effect of further weakening the labor movement between the 
1990s and 2000s108. 
In spite of opposition by the unions, banking sector privatization was presented as a 
resounding success. The IFIs were unanimous in their praise for Pakistan’s banking 
sector’s successful transformation. In Ishrat Hussain’s 2004 report on the banking 
sector for the World Bank and IMF, the banking reforms were hailed as a success that 
was ‘very rare among developing countries’109. The IMF claimed that “An important 
achievement in the last decade has been the transformation of a largely state-owned 
and weak banking system into a healthier, primarily privately-owned system”110 . 
According to the 2010 PRSP the Pakistani banking sector was regarded as “one of the 
fastest growing and best performing sectors in the region” which has made it into 
“one of the top three destinations [within Pakistan] for foreign investment inflows”111. 
Despite all evidence to the contrary, former Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz repeatedly 
described the post-reform banking sector as a ‘vibrant private sector industry’ and an 
‘engine of growth for the economy’112. According to recent press releases by the SBP, 
the performance of the banking system sector ‘remains impressive’, based mainly on 
profitability indicators and capital adequacy ratios113.  
The IMF’s assessment of the post-reform situation seemed to be completely out of 
touch with reality. The 2010 PRSP’s assessment of the situation when lack of long-
term finance was at its peak was that “ongoing financial sector transformation has 
helped in meeting the growing financing requirements of the productive sectors, while 
generating consumption demand through increase in consumer financing that… 
provided a major stimulus to real sector growth in the country”114. According to a 
2014 assessment by the IMF, credit growth from a “healthy financial sector” reflects 
“declining SBP fiscal financing, easing structural bottlenecks, and NFA growth”115. 
Blatantly ignoring the government’s fiscal burden caused by interest payments to 
commercial banks, the 2010 PRSP states that while the pre-reform system was 
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intermediating savings “primarily to fund the fiscal deficit and the losses of the public 
sector”, the “continuous restructuring  [of state-owned banks] has reduced the burden 
on the government and has left few minor areas to concentrate”116. 
The reigning supremacy of a neoliberal logic and the appointment of free market 
economists to important policy making positions means the evaluations are heavily 
biased. There is a complete refusal to accept that privatizations could have suboptimal 
outcomes. In fact, the most prevalent line of criticism against the financial system is 
that it is not liberalized enough. The government (encouraged by the IMF) believes 
that in order to “sustain a high rate of economic growth, a second generation of 
[liberalization] reforms will be needed”117. Comparisons with other late developers 
are studiously avoided. Thus, the underdevelopment of the capital markets is 
uncritically presented as a major problem without considering that most of today’s 
successful late developers, including Korea, developed without any kind of stock or 
bond markets, not to mention the many well known risks and negatives associated 
with capital market development. Rather than institute reforms which force the 
banking system to make productive long-term investments, measures such as 
development of the institutional investor base, including mutual and private pension 
funds, and the introduction of complex new financial products such as index futures 
contracts are made a priority118.  
Conveniently, rather than assessing privatization according to its initial aims, 
success was measured merely by the speed of privatization reforms themselves, the 
high level of bank profitability, and firm level risk and efficiency indicators. 
Forgotten is the fact that the function of a banking system is to channel financial 
resources to those areas most productive for economic development, not purely to 
make high profits for private shareholders. Similarly disregarded was the initial hope 
that bank profitability would both reduce the government debt, and increase 
competition - neither of which have been the case.  
The case of energy was similar. Despite continued protests over rampant load-
shedding119 and tariff increases120, policymakers remained visibly wary of questioning 
the policy framework that produced these conditions. By the late 1990s, the 
worsening of the energy situation was explained away by local policymakers and IFIs 
as a result of privatization reforms not being implemented quickly enough. For 
example, in a 1998 Policy Framework Paper prepared by Pakistani authorities in 
collaboration with the IMF and World Bank Staff, although problems in the energy 
sector are presented as one the key structural issues facing Pakistan, the blame is 
placed on the slow pace of privatization of public sector utilities WAPDA and 
KESC121. According to this report, the poor condition of public utilities is purely the 
result of ‘deteriorating operational efficiency’ and slow implementation of pricing 
reforms aimed at removing subsidies to households and agricultural tube wells. The 
government’s medium term plan to address these problems was based around 
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“accelerating the reform programs in order to achieve efficiency improvements in the 
medium term”, which includes ‘completing the corporatization process’ by 
establishing new commercially oriented power producers, implementing theft 
reduction programs and intensifying bill collection, and raising tariffs to ‘restore 
financial viability’122.  
In the 2004 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), difficulties in the energy 
sector are blamed on the “global downturn in the power sector” (IMF 2004b p. 44). 
By 2010, the PRSP was forced to note the, by then severe, energy crisis, but once 
again stopped short of questioning the policy framework that led to it. Despite the 
crisis, the Pakistani energy sector was praised on the basis that it “has one of the most 
advanced Public Private Partnership programs in the power sector... It has also 
gradually expanded the scope of this program…the response of the private sector 
continues to be positive” (IMF 2010 pg. 126). Major news agencies also saw the main 
problem as the continued presence of public sector utilities. According to an article in 
the Business Recorder, “certain monopolies must be broken to get out of the power 
sector mess… K-Electric123 is a present day success story, why not replicate it?”124. 
The questionable outcomes of privatization and the policies leading to them were 
never questioned, reflecting a consensus at the top. While labor unions and the 
occasional progressive civil society group put up some resistance, Op-eds in major 
newspapers and the overall policy discourse were almost unanimously behind 
privatization. Economists heading important policy institutions ranging from the 
ostensibly autonomous State Bank to the Planning Commission never challenged the 
arguments presented by the government in favor of privatization.  
In short, neoliberalism is not just marked by policy and ideology favoring the 
private over the public sector, but this has been institutionalized within government 
capacity itself and the commercial pressures to which it responds 125 . This 
institutionalization takes a number of forms at global, regional, and national levels. At 
the global level, the key role is played by the IMF and the World Bank, and especially 
the World Bank’s arm dedicated to financing the private sector, the IFC. At the 
regional level, the Asian Development Bank has been pushing this agenda, and 
finally, at the national level, the various people appointed to important positions in the 
government and economic institutions have been zealously pursuing this course.  
 
Conclusion 
 
We show clearly in this paper how privatization in these cases has not only not lived 
up to its multiple claims, including but not limited to reducing the government deficit, 
improving competition and firm efficiency, improving the allocation of resources, 
reducing corruption, and leading to increased overall economic growth, but has in fact 
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made matters worse in almost all of these aspects. The outcome has been neither 
economic efficiency nor improved services to the taxpayer but simply the 
privatization of profits and socialization of losses. Resources or ‘rents’ have been 
transferred from the public purse - which could redistribute it to even out social 
inequalities - to selected private hands. While such rents have historically played a 
part in economic development, in the case of Pakistan, they have not been 
accompanied by the corresponding ‘disciplinary mechanism’, which forced business 
interests to carry out their developmental functions in successful developers such as 
the East Asian Tigers.  
What has enabled all this to go unchallenged and largely un-scrutinized is the 
hegemony of the neoliberal paradigm in Pakistan. ‘Neoliberalization’ has swept 
across the world and Pakistan has not been immune to it. While privatization of public 
assets has been a prominent feature of the neoliberal project everywhere, in some 
countries, such as Brazil or India, strong traditions of nationalism or socialist currents 
have tempered the neoliberal turn. In Pakistan, on the other hand, the hegemony of 
neoliberal thought appears complete amongst intellectuals and policymakers. It is of 
course always difficult to prove the absence of something, but from what we could 
tell from our extensive search, there was a distinct lack of debate around privatization 
in Pakistan. The dominant discourse among policy makers showed a zealous 
commitment to the private sector, even when competitive forces were absent, and a 
state strong enough to regulate economic activity missing. The private sector’s 
superiority was deemed to be inherent, and private enterprises above all suspicion, 
while SOEs were seen to be inefficient, corrupt, and market distorting. This is not to 
imply that SOEs are a good in and of themselves; public ownership can, and has, 
served elite and corporate needs, while marginalizing the poor126. Indeed public banks 
and energy companies in Pakistan suffered from real problems, as detailed above. Our 
argument however, is that uncritical and blanket privatization is not the solution. 
In short, while the neoliberal project has facilitated privatization, the complete 
entrenchment of this paradigm has created a situation in which privatization has come 
to be seen as an end in itself. While even economics textbooks describe specific 
conditions under which privatization may be the way forward, in Pakistan, any 
constraints have now been discarded. If the belief in markets is sufficiently firm, 
privatizations become the only alternative, superior to the public sector under all 
conditions. It is this transformation that we have sought to highlight in this paper. We 
hope that our analysis, based on primary data, of the two privatizations and the 
description of the entrenchment of a neoliberal paradigm in Pakistan, will lead to 
further explorations of this transformation both at macro and micro levels.  
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